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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING




Modem states depend on law, administration, and technical expertise
to define contained spaces of decision making that can be legitimately
treated as separate from the zone of politics. From time to time, however,
the political aspects of decision making in these putatively apolitical do-
mains become visible to large audiences, generating calls for reform that
sometimes yield significant institutional change. In the 1960s, for example,
the normative choices and power relations embedded in decision making
about the technological hazards of modem societies achieved new levels of
visibility. ' Public controversies about which risks were "acceptable," and
who should decide and how, proliferated in a wide range of technical do-
mains. People grew reluctant to trust private companies, or the scientists
and engineers in their employ, to manage environmental hazards or ensure
consumer safety, and they called for the creation of new systems of public
oversight. Social movements demanded a voice in decision making, and the
federal government responded by creating a new regulatory apparatus,
embodied in such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration. In short, a legal and policy discourse that had de-
fined technological risk as a narrow, technical realm, appropriately ad-
* Stephen Hilgartner is Chair of the Department of Science & Technology Studies, Cornell
University, 306 Rockefeller Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. His current research focuses on the social dimen-
sions of emerging technology, especially in the area of genomics and the life sciences. Hilgartner's
book, SCIENCE ON STAGE: EXPERT ADVICE AS PUBLIC DRAMA (2001), published by Stanford Universi-
ty Press, was awarded the Rachel Carson Prize from the Society for Social Studies of Science. The
author acknowledges the support of US National Science Foundation Grant No. 0352000, and Cornell
University's Institute for the Social Sciences.
1. As just one index of this new visibility consider the following best-selling books and the social
movements with which they are now associated: BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR
BODIES, OURSELVES: A BOOK BY AND FOR WOMEN (1973) (on medicine and feminism); RACHEL
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (on pesticides and the environment); RALPH E. LAPP, THE VOYAGE OF
THE LUCKY DRAGON (1957) (on above-ground nuclear testing); RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED
(1965) (on automobile safety and consumer protection).
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dressed through private expert deliberation and post-hoc tort litigation,
broke down as new modes of public accountability and public participation
took shape. 2
There is much evidence that in an analogous way the conceptual and
institutional machinery of intellectual property policy may be in the process
of losing its capacity to contain the politics of this domain. 3 Thirty years
ago intellectual property seemed to be a topic primarily of interest to a
narrow group of specialists. 4 Disputes over patent and copyright infringe-
ment might have involved large sums of money, but they appeared to mat-
ter mainly to the immediate parties, or perhaps to investors, rather than to
broad groups of citizens. Patent law seemed to be safely left to the few
experts, schooled in the relevant technical and doctrinal details, capable of
understanding the arcane legal issues. Most legal scholars saw intellectual
property as politically uninteresting, far removed from the excitement of
such fields as constitutional law. Today, in contrast, intellectual property is
widely perceived as a domain where important societal decisions are rou-
tinely made. In the 1980s and increasingly in the 1990s, visible public con-
troversies often surrounded intellectual property decisions. Much of the
debate centered around areas of rapidly emerging technology, such as bio-
technology, software, and the Internet, with ongoing controversy about
digital copyright and the patenting of life forms, genes, algorithms, and
business methods. Not only did intellectual property expand into new tech-
nical domains, but since 1994 its international reach has grown enormously
with the passage of the controversial agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In this context, a growing number
of scholars, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists, and other
2. See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans.,
Sage Publications 1992) (1986); RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY,
RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS
(1982); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990);
ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, AND RISK (James F. Short, Jr. & Lee Clarke eds., Westview Press
1992) (1989); see also THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
3. Stephen Hilgartner, Acceptable Intellectual Property, 319 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 943, 943-
46 (2002).
4. This is not to say that intellectual property was never controversial until recently. Indeed,
debate about copyright and patent policy stretches back for centuries. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS
AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and
the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19 (Mit-
chell B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993). However, a number of features of the present historical moment
(e.g., the centrality of science and emerging technology in contemporary societies) inflect the current
debate and heighten its significance.
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observers came to see intellectual property policy as a battleground impli-
cated in far-reaching decisions about the future of contemporary societies
and the terms of global governance. 5
The symptoms of this change can be found in many places: the rise of
social movement activism challenging intellectual property policies in such
domains as information technology, genetic technologies, and global
health; extensive discussion on the Internet and in blogs; a burgeoning
scholarly and popular literature; a cascade of policy reports; the creation of
new institutions, such as Creative Commons, 6 aimed at constituting a ro-
bust public domain; and even, in Sweden and several other countries, at-
tempts to launch a political party-the Pirate Party-calling for major
changes, including the gradual abolition of patents. 7 By no means is there
agreement among the diverse people and groups active in the increasingly
visible politics of intellectual property. But there is little doubt that a grow-
ing number of actors are convinced that something is seriously amiss with
the governance of intellectual property.
The expanding public debate raises the question of whether the foun-
dations of intellectual property policy remain adequate for managing the
new, visible politics of decision making in this realm. Are the prevailing
conceptual frameworks and institutions underlying patent policy showing
signs of losing the ability to convincingly render decision making in this
realm into a matter of law, administration, and expert judgment? Is the
basic structure of intellectual property policy sound and only in need of
relatively minor adjustments in doctrine and implementation? Or is the
traditional framework running up against deeper problems that can only be
addressed through more fundamental reforms?
5. This vast and diverse literature cannot be reviewed here, but a few illustrative sources include:
LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE (2001); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS
ACADEMIC WORK?: BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001); NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006);
BRONWYN PARRY, TRADING THE GENOME: INVESTIGATING THE COMMODIFICATION OF BIO-
INFORMATION (2004); PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff
ed., 2003); ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LtNUX AND OPEN
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999); RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE,
FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gay ed., 2002); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How
IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001); JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN
ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP (2006); LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at
1-483 (James Boyle ed.).
6. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
7. See The Pirate Party, Piratpartiet, http://www.piratpartiet.se/international/english (last visited
Mar. 24, 2009).
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This paper argues that there is a mismatch between traditional intellec-
tual property doctrine and the new politics of intellectual property. To ex-
amine the nature of the mismatch, I contrast two frameworks that both
appear in contemporary debate about intellectual property: the traditional
discourse that focuses on innovation policy, and a newer, less clearly codi-
fied discourse that views intellectual property issues from the perspective
of the politics of technology. This latter discourse focuses on the challenge
of democratic governance in a world where emerging technologies have
assumed a central role in constituting the future, raising far-reaching ques-
tions about how they should be fitted into social orders. 8 The traditional
discourse still dominates policy discussion, a fact that has inspired some
ingenious efforts to squeeze concerns about technology and democracy into
the traditional innovation framework. In addition, some of the most impres-
sive work on intellectual property, especially in the arena of digital tech-
nology, mixes innovation and politics-of-technology concerns. 9 To treat
these dimensions of the current debate as separate, as this paper does, ad-
mittedly entails glossing over some complexities. Nevertheless, parsing the
issues into these two perspectives is a useful heuristic device. In particular,
recognizing the specific features of the politics-of-technology perspec-
tive-and presenting its distinctive vision of what is at stake in intellectual
property-clarifies the struggles now in play.
This paper begins by introducing each policy discourse in turn, then
compares them systematically, examining how each views the nature of
technological change, the powers that patents convey, the roles of inventors
and citizens, and the criteria for evaluating policy. My discussion will focus
on patent policy, but some similar issues arise in relation to copyright.
Much of this argument is also relevant to other mechanisms that create
8. For an analysis of how technology becomes a site for reshaping rights, duties, liberties, and
identities in fundamental, even quasi-constitutional, ways, see STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-
PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004); Sheila Jasanoff, In a Consti-
tutional Moment, in SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: LOOKING BACK, AHEAD 155
(Bemward Joerges & Helga Nowotny eds., 2003); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (presenting an extended argument about how computer code functions
like law in cyberspace, making information technology into a tool for reshaping social orders).
9. See, e.g., BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS, supra note 5; TARLETON GILLESPIE,
WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE (2007); LESSIG, supra note 5;
STALLMAN, supra note 5. This mixing of innovation and politics-of-technology concerns is perhaps
especially prevalent in debate over copyright, which directly and obviously invokes constitutional
matters of free speech and the conditions necessary to sustain a democratic polity, e.g., LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004), as well as matters of innovation and creativity.
[Vol 84:1
2009] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 201
intellectual property rights or quasi-rights in emerging technology, such as
database protection regimes and Material Transfer Agreements. 10
I. THE INNOVATION POLICY PERSPECTIVE
A first step in developing this argument is to characterize briefly the
traditional policy discourse for framing intellectual property. By a "policy
discourse" I refer to an organized assemblage of concepts, categories, narr-
atives, metaphors, and frames that gives structure to an arena of policymak-
ing. "1 Policy discourses define problems, frame tensions and choices, and
create orientations toward the world that, as the discourse grows successful,
become embodied in institutional structures, legal doctrine, analytic tech-
niques, informal norms, and standard operating procedures. The policy
discourse about intellectual property is thoroughly institutionalized in, for
example, patent offices, business practices, and a huge body of legal and
scholarly literature. Here I want to ignore the countless variations among
patent and copyright, among jurisdictions, among disciplinary approaches
(e.g., law, economics of innovation), and over time, so as to highlight some
of the most basic, even mundane, features of traditional intellectual proper-
ty policy discourse.
The discursive starting point for intellectual property policy is a famil-
iar narrative that casts innovation as a social good, the inventor (or author)
as hero, the free rider as the villain, limited property rights as the solution,
and society as the ultimate beneficiary of the limited rights bargain. 12 This
storyline, once translated into the language of patent law, generates a set of
questions: What counts as a patentable invention? What constitutes in-
fringement? How should novelty be codified? These questions are the
bread and butter of the patent bar. Translated into economic terms, this
story provides an analytic structure capable of framing a variety of more
10. For a discussion of database protection regimes, see, for example, J. H. Reichman and Paul F.
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist
Intellectual Property Environment, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 315. For a
discussion of Material Transfer Agreements, see Philip Mirowski, Livin' with the MTA, 46 MINERVA
317 (2008).
11. See, e.g., FRANK FISCHER, REFRAMING PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AND
DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES (2003); MAARTEN A. HAJER, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCOURSE: ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AND THE POLICY PROCESS (1995); GEORGE LAKOFF,
MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002); DONALD A. SCHON &
MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY
CONTROVERSIES (1994); Maarten A. Hajer, Rebuilding Ground Zero. The Politics of Performance, 6
PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 445 (2005); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
12. BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS, supra note 5; MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).
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refined theoretical perspectives that can be brought to bear on the task of
designing policy to increase social welfare by enhancing innovation. For
example, the leading economic theories of patenting13-such as invention
inducement theory (which holds that patents motivate inventive activity);
disclosure theory (which contends that publication of patents allows future
inventors to build on the patent); and development and commercialization
theory (which argues that patent protection stimulates the additional in-
vestment needed to develop early-stage inventions into marketable
forms)-all take stimulating innovation as the central policy goal. 14 There
is, of course, some question about the extent to which patents actually con-
tribute to innovation and welfare maximization, 15 but this debate generally
assumes that innovation is the proper metric of success. Arguments about
protecting the public domain are also typically framed in terms of innova-
tion, as in the debate over the tragedy of the "anti-commons." 16 The inno-
vation perspective thus defines a common ground on which advocates of
competing schools of thought, such as intellectual property maximalists
(who support more and stronger property rights) and intellectual property
minimalists (who favor fewer and weaker rights), can conduct a policy
debate limited to questions of means. 17 What is the proper level of intellec-
tual property protection? How can intellectual property policy provide ade-
quate incentives for invention without inhibiting follow-on inventions?
Under what conditions does patenting in fact stimulate innovation?
These are important questions, especially given the growing number
of scholars who raise doubts about the extent to which current intellectual
13. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of
Patents, 32 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 1031 (1998).
14. For a typology and analysis of the main rationales for patent, see Birgitte Andersen, If "Intel-
lectual Property Rights" is the Answer, What is the Question? Revisiting the Patent Controversies, 13
ECON. OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECH. 417 (2004).
15. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DOMINIQUE FORAY, THE ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE
(MIT Press 2004) (2000); David, supra note 4; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, in 3, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
SPECIAL ISSUE ON MICROECONOMICS 783 (Martin N. Bailey & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Edwin
Mansfield, How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 217 (1985).
16. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); cf James Boyle, Foreword: The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003,
at 33. Sometimes this is expressed as the freedom to innovate-a formulation that moves substantially
closer to the politics-of-technology perspective described below, without entirely abandoning the
language of innovation. The constitutional significance of the freedom to innovate is especially obvious
in the copyright domain, where issues of freedom of speech are involved, and this formulation often
appears here.
17. James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us,
in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 5, at 97.
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property policy is enhancing innovation. 18 For example, in an analysis
firmly rooted in the innovation perspective, Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner
argue that recent changes in the operation of the U.S. patent system have
led to a proliferation of spurious patents, producing significant transaction
costs, spurring litigation, and creating inefficiencies that threaten produc-
tivity and continued innovation. 19 These innovation-based arguments for
reform merit attention. For this paper, however, the relevant question is
whether a policy discourse focused on innovation still provides an adequate
tool kit for understanding and addressing the new, more visible contention
that animates the contemporary politics of intellectual property.
A. Narrow Discourse
In an important paper, James Boyle 20 criticizes the structure of dis-
course in intellectual property scholarship using the example of gene pa-
tenting. Boyle gives a whirlwind tour of the major arguments against
patents on genetic sequences that appear in public debate. 21 Among the
objections he catalogs are the claims that genes cannot be patented for reli-
gious reasons or because the human genome is the "common heritage of all
mankind. ' ' 22 Another line of argument contends that genes cannot be pa-
tented because they are already owned by "sources"-for example, by the
people whose bodies contain them.23 Critics of gene patents also argue that
18. See, e.g., FORAY, supra note 15; ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005);
LESSIG, supra note 5; Boyle, supra note 16; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16; Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On The Complex Economics of the Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 836 (1990); J.
H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, supra note 10.
19. JAFFE, supra note 4 (calling for reform in the patent system to make it function properly
again).
20. Boyle, supra note 17, at 100-06.
21. Id. Professor Boyle notes that the arguments differ depending on what kind of genetic se-
quence is involved. Precisely what kind of sequence is involved and how the claims are structured are a
critical part of the debate. Thus, people and organizations that support patenting of human genes that
have been isolated and characterized, for example, may oppose patents on other kinds of sequences,
such as expressed sequence tags. E.g., Human Genome Organization, HUGO Statement on the Patent-
ing of DNA Sequences, GENOME DIGEST, April, 6-9 (1995); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A
WORKSHOP (1997) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND RESEARCH TOOLS].
22. Boyle, supra note 17, at 98. See also WHO OWNS LIFE? (David Magnus et. al. eds., 2002) fora
collection of ethical arguments about patenting of life forms and genes. Regarding religious objections
(along with quasi-sacred arguments about the improper commodification of human life), see, for exam-
ple, ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP (1993), JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY
(1998).
23. For an example of a prominent genome scientist making claims about common heritage,
mixed in with comments about confusing discovery and invention, see JOHN SULSTON AND GEORGINA
FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME
266-79 (2002). The most widely discussed dispute concerning "sources" is Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). Moore has inspired much commentary, including BOYLE,
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DNA sequences fail to meet the basic criteria of novelty, nonobviousness,
and utility that would render them patentable subject matter, or that genes
are products of nature better understood as discoveries than inventions.
24
Finally, critics argue against gene patents (or some forms of gene patents)
on the grounds that they would inhibit innovation.25 Boyle's goal is not to
support, oppose, or otherwise evaluate these arguments; however, his aim
is rather to point out that most intellectual property scholars will consider
all but two of these arguments to be entirely irrelevant to policy-oriented
scholarship. The exceptions are the question of patentable subject matter,
and the effects of gene patents on innovation. In other words, the discus-
sion among specialists in intellectual property policy systematically ex-
cludes arguments that are not based in innovation-centered discourse.
Boyle attacks this narrow, innovation-centered focus. Contending that
supplementing analysis of intellectual property with non-innovation con-
cerns would strengthen research in the field, he challenges scholars to find
ways to broaden the issues under consideration. By way of illustration, he
also suggests several possible lines of research to add to the agenda. 26 The
first, which cuts to the heart of one aspect of the innovation-centered dis-
course, is to move beyond the promotion of innovation as a generic catego-
ry and begin to ask questions about what specific kinds of innovations in-
intellectual property policies should seek to promote (for example, in order
to enhance "human flourishing"). 27 The second line concerns introducing
questions about public choice, such as the impact of intellectual property
rights on the policy process. 28 Boyle's suggestions make important moves
in the direction of illustrating ways to move beyond traditional innovation-
centered discourse. In this paper, I take up his challenge in a different way:
namely, by launching a discussion of intellectual property policy from a
different starting point.
supra note 5 at 97-107. The matter has sometimes been framed in terms of "biocolonialism," with
activists connected to indigenous peoples objecting to having their DNA sampled and patented and
legal scholars attempting to establish protcols for achieving group consent. JENNY REARDON, RACE TO
THE FINISH: IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF GENOMICS 103-13 (2005).
24. See, e.g., WHO OWNS LIFE? supra note 22; see also Jon F. Merz, et al., Disease Gene Patent-
ing is a Bad Innovation 2 MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS 299 (1997).
25. These arguments have been especially prominent in discussions of "research tools," such as
expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). See, e.g., Human Ge-
nome Organization, supra note 21; and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note
21.
26. Boyle, supra note 17, at 114-18.
27. Id. at 114.
28. Id. at 116-18.
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II. THE POLITICS-OF-TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVE
One can gain a fresh perspective on what is at stake in the intellectual
property domain by beginning with an increasingly familiar, if only partial-
ly institutionalized, policy discourse. Its point of departure-far removed
from the traditional view-is not a microeconomic just-so story about in-
ventors, free riders, and incentive structures, but a macropolitical one about
the profound role of technological systems in the politics of contemporary
societies. 29 The narrative might begin with the Manhattan Project, the tha-
lidomide disaster, or Silent Spring; or perhaps with the double helix, the
Karen Ann Quinlan case, or the rise of the Internet. But suffice it to say that
during the second half of the twentieth century, people increasingly recog-
nized that decisions about how to wield the awesome power of modem
technologies had become matters of tremendous societal importance. The
role of technology in political conflict and social control became visible in
artifacts as earth shaking as the intercontinental ballistic missile 30 and as
mundane as the speed bump.3 1 Many observers came to see technological
systems as inextricably woven into the social world in ways that simulta-
neously enable and constrain specific forms of life. Emerging technology-
especially in such hotbeds of change as the life sciences, information tech-
nology, biomedicine, and nanotechnology-became a site of contention
where competing groups pursued incompatible normative visions. Indeed,
as people recognized that questions about the shape of technological sys-
tems were nothing less than questions about the future shape of societies,
science and technology achieved central significance in contemporary de-
mocracies. 32 In this context, states face ongoing difficulties trying to me-
diate these tensions and establish mechanisms for addressing problems of
29. For useful reviews of how technology matters in politics, see Wiebe E. Bijker, Why and How
Technology Matters, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS 681 (Robert
E. Goodwin & Charles Tilly eds., 2006); Sheila Jasanoff, Technology as a Site and an Object of Poli-
tics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 745; Judy Wajcman,
The Gender Politics of Technology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL
ANALYSIS, supra, at 707; see also LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR
LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1986). On the changing contextualization of science, see
HELGA NOwOTNY ET AL., RE-THINKING SCIENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND THE PUBLIC IN AN AGE OF
UNCERTAINTY (2001); see also CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS (Dorothy Nelkin
ed., 1979).
30. DONALD A. MACKENZIE, INVENTING ACCURACY: A HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF NUCLEAR
MISSILE GUIDANCE (1990).
3 1. Bruno Latour, Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, in
SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 225, 243-44
(Wiebe E. Bilker & John Law eds., 1992) [hereinafter SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY]. See
also WINNER, supra note 29, at 19-39.
32. See SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES (2005).
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representation and participation in the sociopolitical process that shapes
emerging technology.
To respond to these political challenges, governments have developed
a variety of new policy machinery in a number of institutional sites.33 One
salient example is in the arena of science advice, where governments intro-
duced policies, such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, aimed at
responding to demands for transparency and for wider avenues for public
participation.34 In addition, new mechanisms intended to facilitate "public
engagement" in deliberation about technological choices have prolife-
rated. 35 Research funding agencies have also devoted increasing attention
to the challenges of governing emerging technologies. Thus, in Europe and
the United States, government funders of high-profile scientific initiatives
(e.g., in genomics, nanotechnology, and converging technologies) estab-
lished programs intended to "anticipate and address" societal implications.
The extent to which these official efforts are actually succeeding in making
the governance of science and technology more effective and/or more
democratic remains a matter of debate, 36 and the recurring calls for finding
new ways to involve citizens in deliberative processes are accompanied by
hard-nosed consideration of the obstacles to doing so and of the paradoxes
of representational techniques. 37 Beyond these official responses, a variety
of citizens, social movements, and non-governmental organizations contin-
ue to demand a greater role in shaping emerging technologies and the rules
under which they will operate. 38
33. See DAVID H. GUSTON, BETWEEN POLITICS AND SCIENCE: ASSURING THE INTEGRITY AND
PRODUCTIVITY OF RESEARCH (2000).
34. See JASANOFF, supra note 2; STEPHEN HILGARTNER, SCIENCE ON STAGE: EXPERT ADVICE AS
PUBLIC DRAMA (2000).
35. ALAN IRWIN & MIKE MICHAEL, SCIENCE, SOCIAL THEORY AND PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (2003);
JAMES WILSDON & REBECCA WILLIS, SEE-THROUGH SCIENCE: WHY PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT NEEDS TO
MOVE UPSTREAM (2004); Robin Grove-White, Britain 's Genetically Modified Crop Controversies: The
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission and the Negotiation of "Uncertainty", 9
COMMUNITY GENETICS 170 (2006); Gene Rowe and Lynn J. Frewer, A Typology of Public Engagement
Mechanisms, 30 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 251 (2005).
36. See, e.g., PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 187-92 (2001).
37. See, e.g., Ulrike Felt et al., Visions and Versions of Governing Biomedicine: Narratives on
Power Structures, Decision-Making and Public Participation in the Field of Biomedical Technology in
the Austrian Context, 38 SOC. STUD. ScI. 233 (2008); Javier Lezaun & Linda Soneryd, Consulting
Citizens: Technologies of Elicitation and the Mobility of Publics, 16 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 279
(2007); Steve Rayner, Democracy in the Age of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of Expertise and
Democracy in Public-Sector Decision Making, 30 SCI. & PUB. POL'Y 163 (2003).
38. See CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS (Dorothy Nelkin ed., 1979); STEVEN
EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996); THE NEW
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: INSTITUTIONS, NETWORKS, AND POWER (Scott Frickel & Kelly
Moore eds., 2006); Jasanoff, supra note 29.
206 [Vol 84:1
2009] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND THE POLITICS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 207
In such a context, decisions about intellectual property bear not only
on the traditional issues of innovation policy but also on the question of
how influence over the structure of emerging technological systems will be
allocated. A first-step in understanding the new politics of intellectual
property is therefore to recognize that much of the contemporary debate is
not about stimulating innovation, but centers on concerns about who go-
verns technology and in pursuit of what goals. In a variety of technical
domains, activists and analysts are arguing that intellectual property some-
times grants its owners too much power over the architecture of technolo-
gical systems and the structure of emerging social orders. 39 At the same
time, from a more theoretical perspective, a politics-of-technology view
leads to inquiry about the forms of citizenship that intellectual property
policy facilitates and about the kinds of subjects and objects that the patent
system constitutes. 40 Thus, rather than focusing on innovation, the politics-
of-technology perspective raises questions about how intellectual property
affects the ways in which democratic polities govern their technological
and social futures. How do patents alter the balance of power in processes
that shape emerging technological systems? Do patents sometimes limit the
ability of citizens to have a voice and exercise choice in these processes?
More deeply, what forms of democratic representation, participation, and
citizenship does intellectual property policy tend to support?
A. Contested Boundaries
Such questions are a recognizable feature of the contemporary politics
of intellectual property, but they have been more successful in stimulating
debate and inspiring activism than in influencing policy. One reason is that
politics-of-technology discourse is somewhat diffuse, especially in compar-
ison with the tightly-focused innovation discourse. At the level of the basic
narrative, the macropolitical story about the challenges of democratic go-
vernance in technological societies is much more untidy than the neat little
tale that serves to launch the innovation-centered discourse. The cast of
characters is larger, and a host of conflicting values and interests animate
the story, with some observers seeing the central challenge as generating
the knowledge base for sound decisions, whereas others stress democratic
39. Biotechnology patents are a good example; see the discussion of the patents on the breast
cancer genes below. See also Javier Lezaun, Pollution and the Use of Patents: A Reading of Monsanto
v. Schmeiser, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: BETWEEN COMMERCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 135 (Nico Stehr ed.,
2004). Similar arguments are made about software and other information technology. See, e.g.,
STALLMAN, supra note 5.
40. See ANDREW BARRY, POLITICAL MACHINES: GOVERNING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
(2001).
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decision making and public accountability. Most important, this macropo-
litical story lacks the clean narrative closure of the innovation story, which
reaches a satisfying denouement when the social bargain creating limited
property rights transforms the policy problem into the (superficially) mana-
geable task of striking a "balance" that maximizes technological progress.
In contrast, policy discourse about the politics of technology clearly re-
mains a story without an ending. To what extent and precisely how this
unresolved narrative will be fashioned into institutional form (in the inno-
vation domain or anywhere else) remains unclear.
The failure of the politics-of-technology discourse to be expressed in
intellectual property policy also stems from a second, more fundamental
reason; namely, that questions about technology and democracy do not fit
comfortably within the worldview of the innovation policy discourse.4 1
The innovation perspective frames societal decision making about which
technologies to develop and how to deploy them as being "outside" the
intellectual property arena: they are not matters of patent policy but ques-
tions to be resolved by such means as market mechanisms, regulatory ac-
tion, criminal law, and so forth. The traditional discourse assumes that the
proper purview of intellectual property policy is stimulating the creation of
new technologies; social choices about new technologies should be made
"elsewhere. ' 42 This institutional cartography can be presented as an empir-
ical claim (this is how things are as a matter of law) or as a normative one
(this is how things should be). Often, it seems to encompass a blending of
is and ought.
The politics-of-technology perspective rejects the traditional definition
of the boundaries of intellectual property policy: first, because this perspec-
41. In his critique of structure of scholarly discourse about intellectual property, James Boyle
argues that:
[O]ur concentration on the clash between maximalist and minimalist visions of intellectual
property has produced as an unintended side effect: a curious methodological tunnel vision.
The critical scholars most likely to question the ambit of new rights are, paradoxically, firmly
wedded to the notion that the only legitimate rubric for intellectual property policy is the max-
imization of innovation. All other normative criteria are to be exiled beyond the pale of the
discipline.
Boyle, supra note 17, at 110.
42. The major exception to this idea is the doctrine that the scope of patentable subject matter
should not include inventions contrary to "ordre public" or morality. See, e.g., European Patent Conven-
tion art. 53(a), which states that European patents shall not be granted in respect of "inventions the
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality; such exploitation
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all
of the Contracting States." Gold and Caulfield have proposed expanding the doctrine of denying patents
on ethical grounds to create a "moral tollbooth" that would allow patents to be withheld, revoked, or
suspended to restrain unethical conduct. See E. Richard Gold & Timothy A. Caulfield, The Moral
Tollbooth: A Method That Makes Use of the Patent System to Address Ethical Concerns in Biotechnol-
ogy, 359 LANCET 2268 (2002).
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tive questions the empirical validity of a bright-line distinction between
creating technologies and making social choices about them; second, be-
cause it sees the traditional cartography as tending to constitute members of
the public as "consumers" of prepackaged technologies rather than "citi-
zens" engaged in shaping them; and third, because it has a normative com-
mitment to enabling citizens to exercise voice and choice about emerging
technology before irreversible commitments in specific directions are
made. In short, the politics-of-technology perspective considers patent pol-
icy from a point of view that focuses on questions of democratic gover-
nance and political legitimacy.
III. COMPARING THE PERSPECTIVES
To further explore what is distinctive about the politics-of-technology
view of intellectual property, let us compare it systematically with the more
familiar innovation perspective, examining several fundamental issues: the
nature of technological change; the forms of power that patents convey; the
effect of patents on openness; the roles of inventors and citizens; and the
criteria for evaluating policy.
A. Inventive Steps or Technology in Social Context
The two policy discourses conceptualize technological change in very
different ways. The patent law casts technological change as stemming
from a series of inventive steps taken by identifiable inventors, and its cen-
tral policy goal is to ensure that inventions are efficiently produced, devel-
oped, and introduced into the economy. The traditional discourse tends to
imagine technological change as a rising-tide-raises-all-boats phenomenon
that yields social and economic benefits for everyone, at least in the aggre-
gate and over the long run. It would be an exaggeration (though perhaps
not a great one) to say that innovation discourse often refers to technology
as if it were a one-dimensional variable whose "level" and "rate" of growth
should be the key metrics for measuring policy success. Generally speak-
ing, however, this approach to intellectual property treats technology and
innovation at a high level of abstraction: the focus is on enhancing technol-
ogical innovation as a generic category, maximizing its rate, and propelling
society forward on the path of progress. The traditional discourse also
frames the innovation process as an activity mainly involving technical
experts and managers rather than as one that could, should, or sometimes
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does involve much broader collections of participants. 43 It is also more
compatible with the romanticized vision of the heroic inventor44 than with
the distributed, collective character of many contemporary research net-
works. 4
5
The politics-of-technology discourse appreciates change in a very dif-
ferent way; for it focuses on technology in social context. The contextual
approach leaves this perspective ambivalent about technological change,
which it neither categorically rejects nor uncritically embraces. Technolo-
gical artifacts, standards, and systems are not conceptualized as isolated
entities but as phenomena that are woven into the social world in complex
and consequential ways. To get a handle on technology in context, the poli-
tics-of-technology perspective draws intellectual inspiration from social
and historical studies of technology, rather than the mainstays of the inno-
vation discourse, economics and law.46 In recent decades, a growing body
of scholarship has examined the social processes that shape technological
artifacts and systems and lead them to take particular forms. 47 The field
sports a variety of theoretical perspectives, which I can barely gesture to-
ward here, but central to the enterprise is the notion that technology does
not simply advance in a teleological way toward optimal solutions but is
shaped through a process of negotiation in which normative values about
what constitutes a good solution are themselves at issue.
One of the most influential frameworks is the social construction of
technology (SCOT) approach. 48 SCOT conceptualizes the construction of
43. In contrast to this focus on traditional innovators, such as professional designers and manag-
ers, a growing body of literature demonstrates that the users of technologies are sometimes-and per-
haps even often-important innovators. See, VON HIPPEL, supra note 18. In many contexts, users also
play a central role in designing technologies, subverting designers' intentions, or employing and inter-
preting technologies in unexpected ways. See, e.g., How USERS MATTER: THE Co-CONSTRUCTION OF
USERS AND TECHNOLOGIES (Nelly Oudshoorn & Trevor Pinch eds., 2003) [hereinafter How USERS
MATTER].
44. BOYLE, supra note 5.
45. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC AUTHORSHIP: CREDIT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN SCIENCE (Mario
Biagioli & Peter Galison eds., 2003); Stephen Hilgartner & Sherry 1. Brandt-Rauf, Data Access, Own-
ership, and Control: Toward Empirical Studies ofAcess Practices, 15 SCI. COMM. 355 (1994); Stephen
Hilgartner, Mapping Systems and Moral Orders: Constituting Property in Genome Laboratories, in
STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 8, at 131.
46. The fact that the two discourses connect to different fields of scholarship reinforces the tradi-
tional institutional cartography.
47. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds.
3d ed. 2008); How USERS MATTER, supra note 43; SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY, supra
note 31; THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS].
48. Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How
the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 17.
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technology as a dynamic negotiation among social groups, who often de-
fine goals, problems, and solutions in different ways and work to push
these definitions into alternative designs. The ultimate shape that an artifact
takes is the upshot of these multidirectional struggles. 49 Another approach
focuses on technological systems, such as an electric power network or the
Internet, emphasizing how these systems weave together diverse compo-
nents (including machines, people, organizations, and laws) into function-
ing systems. 50 The process that shapes these systems is often contentious,
and is heavily freighted with normative stakes. Other analysts argue that
designers of technologies build their preconceptions about the users of
technology into artifacts and systems. 5 1 Drawing on visions of users with
particular tastes, competencies, and motives, designers inscribe "scripts"
into technologies that cast users in specific roles, 52 operating like regimes
of governance. 53 A piece of software, for example, invites certain modes of
user interaction while constraining or preventing others. To be sure, users
may resist these roles (at some cost and with varying degrees of success),
so these scripts cannot completely determine their actions, but it is undeni-
able that the designers of technologies often aim to choreograph human
action.
54
Scholars in the field reach diverse conclusions about how much users
can influence technological design or employ technologies in ways that
designers did not imagine. 55 But for our purposes, the key point is that this
body of research suggests that technology is not produced through an apo-
litical process of invention and application but through often-contentious
negotiations that reshape technology and reorder societies. Instead of a
rising tide that raises all boats, specific technological changes create win-
ners and losers and support more or less desirable forms of life. The poli-
tics-of-technology perspective thus frames the ability to influence the shape
of emerging technologies as a key source of power in contemporary socie-
49. Id. at 24-47.
50. THOMAS PARKE HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY,
1880-930 (1983). See also Latour, supra note 31, for a related but distinct approach.
51. Steve Woolgar, Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF
MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER, TECHNOLOGY AND DOMINATION 57 (John Law ed., 1991).
52. Madeleine Akrich, The De-Scription of Technical Objects, in SHAPING
TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY, supra note 31, at 205.
53. Stephen Hilgartner, Biomolecular Databases: New Communication Regimes for Biology?, 17
SCI. COMM. 240 (1995).
54. For intellectual property scholars, debate over the use of technology to control users has been
especially visible in the realm of digital copyright. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 9; GILLESPIE, supra
note 9.
55. For a discussion of differences on this point between a number of frameworks, including those
of Woolgar and Akrich mentioned above, see How USERS MATTER, supra note 43.
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ties. In contrast, the innovation discourse, with its teleological vision of
apolitical progress, leaves little space for the idea that technological design
even has a politics.
Viewing technology in social and political context leads to an outlook
on intellectual property policy that little resembles the traditional view. If
the policy problem for the innovation discourse is economic maximization,
then the problem for the politics-of-technology discourse is democratic
decision making. Abandoning the notion that technological change is apo-
litical and imaging it as involving choices among ways of life immediately
raises important questions: Who participates in making these choices?
Through what institutions? With what implications for the operation of
power and the legitimacy of political institutions? Thus, the politics-of-
technology perspective suggests that patent policy should be evaluated in
terms of its role in shaping the dynamics of democratic choice, the nature
of citizenship, and the legitimacy of political institutions in societies under-
going rapid technological and social change.
B. Market Power or Configuration Power
The two discourses also differ sharply on the kinds of power that they
imagine patents convey to their owners. The innovation perspective frames
patents primarily as a source of market power, emphasizing their role in
enabling inventors (or their licensees) to profit from their creations. In the
paradigmatic case, the patent provides a means to solve free rider problems
and encourage investments in research and development (R&D), commer-
cialization, and other innovative activity. But the politics-of-technology
perspective takes a broader view of the uses of patent rights, focusing on
the powers that patents grant over the social relations surrounding and em-
bedded in specific technologies. Rather than only conveying market power,
intellectual property rights also convey what one might call configuration
power-the ability to influence how technologies are intertwined with the
social world. Configuration power can be exerted in the negotiations that
shape technological artifacts, infrastructures, or systems, but the key point
is that it involves not only technology but also social relations. 56
The traditional discourse pays little attention to configuration power.57
It is often said that patents "merely" grant the inventor the right to exclude
others from selling or using the invention, and this truism is accurate
56. Market power and configuration power, of course, often operate hand in hand, with each
enhancing the other.
57. To the extent it does, it is mainly through discussions of establishing technical standards that
produce orderly markets and paths to commercialization.
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enough in a rigidly literal sense. But such formulations obscure the extent
to which the right to exclude creates leverage that yields additional powers,
such as what Eleanor Ostrom and her colleagues, 58 have termed "manage-
ment rights"-which grant control over decision making about a resource.
With a patented invention, such managerial rights radiate outward from the
invention itself to encompass a variety of decisions aimed at shaping the
terms under which the invention is intertwined with broader social and
technical orders. Put otherwise, patents can serve as a vehicle for asserting
managerial dominion not only over the invention itself, but also over the
social relations surrounding it.
The patents on the breast cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, issued to
Myriad Genetics, Inc. and Oncormed, Inc. or licensed by them, offer a case
in point. 59 These companies, along with several other providers, wanted to
market genetic testing services to women seeking predictive information
about their breast and ovarian cancer risk. The two companies engaged in
litigation, but reached an out-of-court settlement that left Myriad with ex-
clusive rights to diagnostic testing for the BRCA genes in the United
States. 60 These rights not only gave the company power to make decisions
about pricing and licensing, but also to configure the social and technical
"architecture" of breast cancer testing services in a manner of its choos-
ing.61 These architectural decisions included, but also extended beyond,
matters of market power, such as price and "access" to testing services.
Indeed, a number of organized groups-breast cancer activists, physicians,
bioethicists, genome scientists, and professional societies, such as the
American Society for Human Genetics--engaged in robust debate about
the sociotechnical architecture of testing services: Who was an appropriate
"user" of novel, incompletely-studied, and potentially risky predictive ge-
netic tests? How should eligibility for testing be determined and by whom?
Should such tests be made available only in a research context or as a
commercial service? What kind of technological platform should be used to
58. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a
Common-Pool Resource, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (2003).
59. For a book length analysis of the introduction of breast cancer genetic testing in the U.S. and
U.K., see SHOBITA PARTHASARATHY, BUILDING GENETIC MEDICINE: BREAST CANCER, TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE (2007). Parthasarathy describes how a number of
patents were involved, setting the stage for interference and litigation. Id. at 116-18, 236-37. On-
corMed was granted a BRCA I patent covering its consensus sequence. U.S. Patent No. 5,654,155 (filed
Feb. 12, 1996). Myriad was granted BRCAI patents shortly thereafter. See U.S. Patent 5,693,473 (filed
June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7,
1995). In addition, OncorMed obtained exclusive licenses to two BRCA2 patents. U.S. Patent No.
5,622,829 (filed Apr. 19, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 6045997, (issued Apr. 4, 2000).
60. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 59, at 117-120.
61. Id.at57.
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implement testing? How should quality standards for conducting tests be
structured? Should post-test counseling be provided as part of the testing
package? How should uncertainties about the meaning of test results be
presented to non-geneticists? Should tests be advertised directly to women
or only to physicians? 62 Myriad's exclusive managerial rights gave it the
capacity to make decisions about these aspects of the architecture of BRCA
testing services in the United States, and the company systematically elimi-
nated the alternative architectures that had been put in place before it con-
solidated control over the U.S. market. 63
As this example suggests, patents do not just allocate the economic
benefits of successful inventions; they also allocate voice and choice in
processes that shape technological systems, providing patent holders with
managerial rights that may yield considerable power to make architectural
decisions (and the normative choices embedded in them). To be sure, con-
figuration power, like market power, is not absolute. Individuals and
groups can still resist the efforts of patent holders to configure their rela-
tionships with particular technologies. In the Myriad case, a number of
other countries configured BRCA testing in rather different ways, 64 a task
that sometimes required actively resisting Myriad's efforts to use its patent
position to impose its architectural preferences. 65 But there is little doubt
that intellectual property can be a powerful resource in social negotiations
about the shape of emerging technological systems or artifacts. Patents, of
course, are far from the only source of configuration power, just as they are
far from the only source of market power; nevertheless, the importance of
emerging technologies and the exclusive rights that they convey make pa-
tents a significant source of both. Patents that are difficult to invent around,
62. Widely discussed risks include the possibility that women and their physicians would take
unnecessary and undesirable interventions, such as prophylactic mastectomies, on the basis of uncertain
information. Alternatively, favorable results might produce unwarranted confidence, leading people to
stop getting mammograms.
63. As Shobita Parthasarathy shows, in 1996 there was no consensus about how breast cancer
testing services should be organized and how these novel services should be introduced into widespread
use while their efficacy and risks remained incompletely understood. PARTHASARATHY, supra note 59,
at 58-95. Several very different testing architectures were put in place by different actors. For example,
Myriad, which promoted BRCA testing with direct-to-consumer advertising and would test any sample
sent to it by a physician, took a very different approach than did Oncormed, a company that only of-
fered tests to women deemed to be at high risk. See id. at 93-95 (Table 2.1) (systematically comparing
the architectures of four American testing centers that offered the tests prior to Myriad establishing
complete control over the test in the United States).
64. For a comparison of the configuration of breast cancer testing in the U.S., the U.K., and
France, see Ilana L6wy & Jean Paul Gaudillire, Localizing the Global: Testing for Hereditary Risks of
Breast Cancer, 33 So. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 299 (2008).
65. For an analysis of Myriad's efforts to extend its testing regime to the United Kingdom, see
PARTHASARATHY, supra note 51.
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such as disease gene patents, may yield configuration power that is espe-
cially significant in constraining citizen participation in decision making.
C. Transparent or Opaque
The two discourses also differ in their views of the effect of patents on
the openness of decisions about emerging technologies. The innovation
perspective frames patents as a source of transparency, contrasting them
with trade secrecy as a means of protecting innovations. Because of the
disclosure requirement, patents appear at first glance to be more public and
open than trade secrets; after all, the inventor must publish the patent rather
than conceal the trade secret. Future inventors therefore can build on know-
ledge that would be locked away under a trade secret regime. Of course,
within the economics literature there is some debate about whether and
under what conditions the disclosure requirement actually enhances inno-
vation, since trade secrets do not prevent competitors from using inventions
that they independently replicate, whereas patents do. 66 Also, under some
circumstances, the goal of seeking patent protection may encourage secrecy
in the research process. Even among academic scientists (not to mention
private companies) efforts to secure patents may, at least to some degree,
encourage delays in publication or inhibit data sharing. 67 Not only can
secrecy propagate upstream from the point of potential patent, 68 but univer-
sity research is often entangled in a variety of elaborate practices for con-
trolling access to emerging research results. 69 The extent to which the
66. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4; LEVIN ET AL., supra note 15; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note
13.
67. See, e.g., MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 121-
31 (1986); Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life Science: Prevalences
and Predictors, 81 ACAD. MED. 137 (2006); Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics: Evidence From a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and
Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013 (2006); John P. Walsh, Charlene
Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View From the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002
(2005). See also Phil Mirowski, supra note 10, who argues that extant survey research, especially the
study by Walsh et al. supra, underestimates the extent to which intellectual property concerns are
restricting data sharing in university-based science. Historical studies point out that university patenting
and secrecy in academic research are not simply a "new" phenomenon. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAPN, THE
SCIENTIFIC LIFE: A MORAL HISTORY OF A LATE MODERN VOCATION (2008); Grischa Metlay, Reconsi-
dering Renormalization: Stability and Change in 20th-Century Views on University Patents, 36 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 565 (2006).
68. See, e.g., Stephen Hilgartner, Access to Data and Intellectual Property: Scientific Exchange in
Genome Research, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 21, at 28-
39.
69. See Mirowski, supra note 10, for an analysis of how Material Transfer Agreements are increa-
singly functioning as a form of"quasi-IP" with significant effects on data sharing in university research.
The technology licensing practices of universities are also relevant here. See, e.g., Lori Pressman, et al.,
The Licensing of DNA Patents by U.S. Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE
BIOTECH. 31 (2006).
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"inherently public" nature of patents actually accelerates innovation clearly
merits ongoing study and debate.
But from the politics-of-technology perspective, a different issue
emerges; for a patent grants the right to make managerial decisions pertain-
ing to an invention in an opaque, proprietary space. Generally speaking, the
holders of patent rights enjoy the right to conduct private, closed delibera-
tions about whether or not to develop a patented invention, how aggressive-
ly to invest in it, how to structure licensing agreements, how to configure
the roles of users, how to structure system architecture, and so forth. As a
result, sociotechnical roads-not-taken may remain invisible even after in-
frastructures stabilize or products are brought to market. In the Myriad
case, diverse architectural possibilities became visible-in part owing to
alternative business models and in part because activists and professionals
were already energetically engaged in contention about genetic testing
when the BRCA genes were found. 70 But public disclosures about roads-
not-taken are the exception not the norm. The politics-of-technology pers-
pective thus stresses that the patent system, at least as presently constituted,
is completely consistent with opaque decision making that creates barriers
to wider participation in social negotiations about technology. The same, of
course, might be said for trade secrets, which obviously entail closed deci-
sion making, but the fact that trade secrets do not create exclusive rights
leaves open the possibility that competing firms will offer alternative socio-
technical configurations in the marketplace.
D. Inventors or Citizens
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the two discourses
is that each centers on a different figure. For the innovation perspective,
that figure is the "inventor"; for the politics-of-technology discourse, it is
the "citizen." Innovation discourse emphasizes a relatively narrow set of
parties whose ownership rights arise from their proximity to the inventive
step. In particular, the traditional discourse lavishes much attention on var-
ious species of inventors, including those who already hold patent rights
(that must be protected from infringement), those who have created novel
inventions (who deserve patent rights), and those who will create novel
70. In addition, comparative studies of science and technology, both historical and contemporary,
can make visible alternative ways to structure technological systems. E.g., THOMAS PARKE HUGHES,
NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930 (1983); JASANOFF, supra
note 32; PARTHASARATHY, supra 59. Lwy and Gaudilli~re's comparison of BRCA testing in the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom provides a good example and shows "how the owner-
ship of tests shapes practices." Lowy & Gaudillire, supra note 64, at 303-06.
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things in the future (but require access to information to do so). The legal
machinery of the patent system focuses on inventors (along with their li-
censees, financial backers, and competitors, and the firms that develop and
market their inventions), and the analytic approach of innovation econom-
ics pays inventors a similar compliment. While not absent from innovation
discourse, the public plays a relatively passive role, appearing late in the
R&D process as the beneficiary of technological progress. To the extent
that members of the public play an active role in shaping technology, they
do so mainly as "consumers" expressing choices in markets, or as citizens
exercising political choice in a reactive mode-a situation that has stimu-
lated the rise of a small social science industry aimed at anticipating which
new technologies will spark active opposition. 71
In contrast, the politics-of-technology discourse is centrally concerned
with the challenges of legitimate decision making in democratic societies
concerning technological change, and it focuses on the rights of citizens
and problems of representation and participation in the sociopolitical
processes that shape emerging technology. Accordingly, this discourse is
concerned with a broad collection of actors with various stakes in technol-
ogical development. These actors include not only those who claim rights
based on their innovative activities, but also those who claim rights
grounded in other ways, such as software engineers or computer users
claiming rights to use algorithms or to modify code; 72 scientists claiming
rights to forms of scientific life relatively unencumbered by commercial
restrictions; 73 and disease activists who have claimed moral rights to influ-
ence research and sociotechnical systems related to their disease, 74 for
example, by challenging the morality of high-priced patented drugs, resist-
ing patenting of "their" genes, 75 or seeking to gain control by obtaining
patents themselves. 76
The politics-of-technology perspective also criticizes the active-
inventor, passive-citizen frame that the innovation discourse takes to be
natural. More precisely, this perspective holds that innovation discourse
71. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Alain Nadai & Ilya Fischhoff, Investing in Frankenfirms: Predict-
ing Socially Unacceptable Risks, 2 .J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 100 (2001).
72. STALLMAN, supra note 5.
73. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY; JOHN
SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, supra note 23; Paul Ginsparg, Next-Generation Open Access, CT
WATCH Q., August 2007, at 11.
74. EPSTEIN, supra note 38.
75. Eliot Marshall, Genetic Testing: Families Sue Hospital, Scientist for Control of Canavan
Gene, 290 SCIENCE 1062 (2000).
76. Sharon F. Terry & Patrick F. Terry, A Consumer Perspective on Forensic DNA Banking, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 408 (2006).
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does not merely picture the world in this way, but that its institutional and
conceptual machinery helps to build this vision into the world. Through its
everyday operation in many dispersed sites, the patent system distills the
continuities and complexities of research and development into such sty-
lized categories as inventor, invention, and inventive steps. Issuing a patent
constitutes an inventor-invention dyad, simultaneously producing an own-
er, an ownable entity, and a set of non-owners which includes not only free
riders and competing firms, but also citizens, activists, users, and others. As
it constitutes the subjects and objects of property in this way, the patent
system not only depends on sharp distinctions between inventor and user,
designer and consumer, and R&D and public choice, but renders them into
legally significant social facts. By creating concentrations of configuration
power, the patent system narrows the avenues through which citizens might
expect to shape technology, although these avenues obviously are not (and
cannot be) completely closed.
E. Efficient Innovation or Adequate Representation
Even the most pragmatic of policy discourses implicitly define norma-
tive ideals, and the two discourses clearly frame these ideals in different
terms. For the innovation discourse, the central policy challenge is balanc-
ing the tensions among different various species of inventors (past, present,
future, etc.), between creating incentives for innovation and creating mo-
nopolies, and so forth. Innovation analysts recognize that it would be uto-
pian to imagine achieving such a balance in a real world of conflicting
interests, incomplete knowledge, and blunt policy instruments. Most of
them also concede that it is impossible to create an operational definition of
economic efficiency that does not favor particular interests. But the innova-
tion discourse nevertheless sets as its normative vision a world in which
policies produce efficient markets, robust technological progress, economic
and social benefits for all, and just rewards for innovators.
For the politics-of-technology discourse, the central policy challenge
involves finding ways to ensure that society makes choices about emerging
technology through procedures that reflect democratic values, ensuring
adequate representation and addressing deficits in democratic decision
making. Politics-of-technology analysts fully recognize that actual demo-
cracies will always fall short of utopian visions of the democratic state, and
they are also well aware that democracy is an "essentially contested con-
cept" that covers many competing definitions and machineries for instan-
tiating them. Moreover, tensions between expertise and democracy are a
major theme of scholarship on the politics of technology. Nevertheless, this
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discourse holds as a normative ideal a world in which democratic institu-
tions are structured in a manner that grants citizens the right to democratic
choice about emerging technology and the future of society.
These distinct normative orientations imply different perspectives to-
ward evaluating policy proposals. These differences do not necessarily
mean that those who are committed to the innovation perspective will nec-
essarily support different policies from those who take a politics-of-
technology view. On the contrary, in some areas representatives of these
different schools of thought may pursue different analytic paths to the same
destination.
Consider, for example, proposals to tighten standards of patentability.
A growing number of innovation analysts support rectifying what they
perceive as the unduly lax standards for granting patents that have devel-
oped over the last few decades: they seek to raise the bar for the novelty,
nonobviousness, and utility tests, to intensify scrutiny of patent claims, and
to create new mechanisms for challenging them. 77 The precise proposals
are numerous and varied, but the innovation analysts who advance such
reforms do so with the goal of attacking perverse incentives and reducing
litigation and other threats to economic efficiency.
Many politics-of-technology analysts would support similar reforms,
seeking to set a high burden of proof against policies that expand patent
rights to new domains, make them easier to obtain, or extend their reach.
77. There are a range of such reform proposals (which are at times incompatible). See, e.g.,
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15 ch. 10-12 (arguing for improving the transparency of patent claims
so the boundaries of claims are more predictable, enforcing strong limits on highly abstract claims that
reach beyond what was actually discovered, and instituting institutional reforms in the patent office);
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 171-207 (arguing for instituting pre-grant opposition to allow outside
parties to provide information on the prior art, establishing a strong re-examination producedure, and
enhancing decision making about novelty and nonobviousness); John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent
System, 287 SCIENCE 1933 (2000) (arguing for raising standards for patentability, establishing an auto-
matic, royalty-free license for research use of patented inventions, and using the utility doctrine to
prevent the patenting of fundamental concepts); Mark Lemley, et al., What to Do about Bad Patents,
REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10 (arguing for weakening the presumption of validity of issued
patents and for establishing a post-grant opposition system); see also MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K.
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2009) (making an economic argument claiming that
intellectual property is an "unnecessary evil"). Major policy reports include a 2003 Federal Trade
Commission report that presented a number of recommendations, including enacting legislation to
specify that courts "require only a 'preponderance of the evidence' to rebut the presumption of validity"
[of a patent] rather than using the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, FED. TRADE COMM'N, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8
(2003), and a 2004 National Research Council report that offered seven recommendations, including
assiduously observing the nonobviouness standard and considering legislation to open up review proce-
dures and allow for third-party challenges, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
2 1s
r 
CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY ch. 4 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). The policy debate since
2005 has been accompanied by ongoing struggle over major patent reform legislation in the U.S. Con-
gress; at the time of this writing, major reform legislation has not been passed into law.
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But they would ground their arguments not in innovation terms but with
reference to monopolies of configuration power and the effects of patents
on democratic choice. They would also tend to support making patents
easier to challenge, although unlike innovation analysts, they might advo-
cate challenge procedures that admit arguments based on concentrations of
configuration power or the moral claims of stakeholders, citizens, and users
of technology. Most crucially, politics-of-technology analysts would seek
intensive public engagement in cases involving fundamental technological
developments widely expected to be implicated in "revolutionary" social
change. While a patent on the random widget would not warrant special
scrutiny, some intellectual property decisions raise deep, quasi-
constitutional questions, owing to their potential to grant significant confi-
guration power in a consequential domain. 78 Politics-of-technology ana-
lysts would insist that such decisions are simply too important to settle
using traditional intellectual property doctrine and its narrow administrative
procedures.
These distinct normative orientations are also reflected in stances to-
ward open source production. Innovation analysts are engaged in debate
about whether intellectual property policy should be modified to support
new models of user-centered production (or peer-production), as exempli-
fied in "free" or "open source" software. These labels reflect different po-
litical goals-with advocates of free software explicitly arguing for the
moral and political advantages of such models-and cover a wide variety
of institutional structures. 79 Some innovation analysts, such as Jaffe and
Lerner, contend that the jury is still out as to whether open source or pro-
prietary production of software is more successful. 80 They also believe that
software developers should be allowed to choose whether to follow an open
source or proprietary model, and that policy reforms designed specifically
to promote open source are not justified. Others argue on innovation
78. Examples might include decisions that bear on control over the building blocks of synthetic
biology or the terms of access to information on the Internet, as well as such crucial cases as Diamond
v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303 (1980), which allowed, in a 5-4 decision, the patenting of an engineered
microorganism. On the challenges for intellectual property policy in synthetic biology, see Arti Rai &
James Boyle, Synthetic Biology: Caught between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Com-
mons, 5 PLOS BIOL 389 (2007). Regarding Internet search technology and control, see, for example,
IAN H. WITTEN, ET AL., WEB DRAGONS: INSIDE THE MYTHS OF SEARCH ENGINE TECHNOLOGY (2007);
see also LESSIG, CODE supra note 8; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 9; LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS, supra note 5.
79. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); RAYMOND, supra note 5; STALLMAN, supra note 5; Ruben van Wen-
del de Joode et al., Rethinking Free, Libre and Open Source Software, KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL'Y,
Winter 2006, at 5.
80. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 200-02.
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grounds that open source software has strong advantages. More generally,
Eric von Hippel, for example, argues that user-centered innovation in soft-
ware and many other domains has advantages that yield social welfare
benefits, and that government policy, which now favors manufacturer-
centered innovation, should be changed to level the playing field. 81
For politics-of-technology analysts, however, efficiency is only a sec-
ondary concern. What is most interesting about the many projects grouped
under such labels as "open source" are their political possibilities. At least
some mechanisms for organizing open source production appear to distri-
bute configuration power in new, and potentially more inclusive, ways than
do traditional modes of innovation. From this standpoint, open source pro-
duction looks like more than a new way to create innovative products; it is
also a means to constitute new kinds of collective subjects for guiding the
innovation process. Put otherwise, open source production (in its many
possible forms) offers an arena for experimenting with new institutional
structures for constituting the subjects and objects of property, offering
alternatives to those embedded in traditional intellectual property law.82
From a politics-of-technology view, such experiments would be of interest
even in the (unlikely) event that open source production were shown to
yield absolutely no innovation-based advantages.
Ultimately, however, the politics-of-technology discourse remains
stronger on critique than on offering alternatives, not least because models
for reform remain hard to develop and test given the constraints of existing
law and policy. It is easy to imagine mechanisms for reducing monopolies
on configuration power; for example, by awarding or licensing unusually
important patents not to the inventor alone but to novel legal entities specif-
ically constituted to give some managerial rights to representatives of rele-
vant citizen and stakeholder groups. For example, a patent on a disease
gene might be held by a legal entity that gave royalty rights to the named
inventor but distributed voting rights on managerial decisions among a
board whose members had fiduciary duties to citizens and relevant disease
groups, medical specialties, and scientific societies. Charitable trust mod-
els, which have been proposed as an alternative to proprietary control over
81. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, supra note 18, at I (arguing that user-based innovation allows users "to
develop exactly what they want, rather than relying on manufacturers to act as their (often very imper-
fect) agents."); and id., at 107-19.
82. A sense of the range of possible structures for governing open source production can be
gleaned by considering the range of governance structures found in common-property regimes. See
Hess & Ostrom, supra note 58. See also RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL,
AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds.1996).
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human biomaterials, 83 could also be extended to intellectual property. Giv-
en the political and legal obstacles to implementing such proposals, howev-
er, it is not surprising that activists whose concerns center on the control
over technology often choose to package their arguments in terms of inno-
vation and patentable subject matter rather than take on the burden of
pressing for broader change.
CONCLUSION
Starting points matter. Observers who begin their analysis of intellec-
tual property issues from within the traditional discourse often seem unable
to escape its limited perspective. Many such observers contend that public
opposition to controversial patents stems from misunderstandings of legal
doctrine, from attempts to inject social issues into the patent domain, from
sensational media coverage, and from policy analysis that treats anecdotes
as evidence. These arguments, which parallel the "deficit model" in risk
disputes, 84 tend to equate public opposition with public ignorance. Howev-
er, the analysis above suggests that growing public debate about intellectual
property is better understood as a symptom of institutional deficits in dem-
ocratic decision making about emerging technologies. Explicitly recogniz-
ing an alternative politics-of-technology discourse-and outlining its
distinctive perspective on intellectual property issues--clarifies the nature,
and the extent, of the contradictions between existing patent policy and the
increasingly vocal demands of activists, citizens, and others engaged in
contention about emerging technology (see Table 1).
Rather than attributing controversy to public misunderstanding, this
perspective sees activists who oppose patenting such entities as genes, al-
gorithms, or business methods as legitimate stakeholders who correctly
perceive intellectual property as bestowing not only market power, but also
configuration power. In this view, such activists are not "injecting" ques-
tions of social policy into the patent domain; those issues are already
present. Moreover, the claim that social concerns properly belong outside
the intellectual property system (to be addressed "later" in the process of
developing, commercializing, and regulating new technology) seems not to
be grounded in necessity or wisdom, but to rest on rhetorical "boundary
83. David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic
Biobanks, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180 (2003); see also David E. Winickoff, Partnership in the U.K.
Biobank: A Third Wayfor Genomic Property, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440 (2007).
84. MISUNDERSTANDING SCIENCE?: THE PUBLIC RECONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (Alan Irwin & Brian Wynne eds., 1996).
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work"85 aimed at shoring up an archaic institutional cartography that fails
to recognize the degree to which emerging technology has become a prin-
cipal site of emerging politics. Giving meaningful consideration to the poli-
tics of technology in the intellectual property domain in no way suggests
that patents and copyrights should be simply eliminated or even vastly
curtailed. But taking the politics of technology seriously does imply the
need for a wider analysis--one that does not try to make a virtue of neg-
lecting the quasi-constitutional dimensions of technology (see Table 1).
The analysis presented above admittedly provides a very high-altitude
picture of an extremely complex terrain, highlighting coherences and neg-
lecting much complexity and detail. However, if the broad contours of this
analysis are correct, then there are reasons to expect that public contention
about intellectual property policy will remain an ongoing feature of con-
temporary politics. Traditional doctrine, with its emphasis on innovation
and its focus on a relatively narrow group of actors, is poorly equipped for
considering questions of democratic representation in decision making
about the shape of future technological and social orders. Bringing politics-
of-technology concerns into dialogue with innovation discourse offers one
avenue for broadening discussion to encompass many critical issues. In the
longer run, however, states will need to make creative institutional adjust-
ments-within and beyond the intellectual property domain-to preserve
democratic values in a world where emerging technologies and emerging
politics are everywhere intertwined.
85. THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1999).
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Table 1: Summary of the two discourses about intellectual property
Innovation Politics of Technology
Normative Focus Technological pro- Democratic choice
gress
Central Figure The inventor The citizen
Emerging As a source of eco- As a means of
Technology nomic growth (re)ordering social and
technical worlds
As politically neu- As a contested domain
tral
Stakes Economic Shape of sociotechnical
systems
Domain of R&D policy Quasi-constitutional
Policymaking questions about the fu-
ture
Form of Power Market power Configuration power
Emphasized
Effect on Open publication of Opaque decision making
Transparency the patent itself pre- and post- filing for
the patent
Vision of Successful Economic effi- Adequate representation
Policy ciency
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